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COMMENTS
RECONSIDERING THE ILLINOIS DRAM SHOP
ACT: A PLEA FOR THE RECOGNITION OF A
COMMON LAW ACTION IN CONTEMPORARY
DRAM SHOP LITIGATION
On June 25, 1978, having already consumed a considerable
amount of liquor, Fred Gustafson drove to two Illinois taverns and
purchased more alcohol.' Upon leaving the premises, employees of
the two taverns physically escorted Gustafson to his car. Gustafson
displayed conduct showing a reckless disregard for his safety. Inside
the car, visible to those who escorted him, were five of Gustafson's
children. Later that evening, an automobile accident took the life of
Gustafson and four of his children.'
Gustafson's wife sued the owners of the taverns for damages
under the Illinois Dram Shop Act (the "DSA").3 Because of the
stringent statutory limitations,* Mrs. Gustafson was entitled to recover a maximum award of only $35,000 from the defendants.' Because the DSA relies upon the doctrine of strict liability,5 the tavern
1. Gustafson v. Mathews, 109 Ill. App. 3d 884, 886, 441 N.E.2d 388, 389 (1982).
2. Id. at 885-86, 441 N.E.2d at 389.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983).
4. Section 135 of the Dram Shop Act limits recoverable damages for loss of
property of any person to $15,000, and $20,000 for loss of means of support. Thus,
assuming Mrs. Gustafson could prove $15,000 worth of property damage, and prove
her means of support was damaged by $20,000, she would only receive a total of
$35,000. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43 § 135 (1983). In addition to property damage and
loss of means of support, the DSA allows recovery for personal injury up to $15,000
for each person. Id. Thus, each surviving person, in this instance the one child, could
potentially recover $15,000 individually from the tavern owners based upon a personal injury claim. See also Zamiar v. Linderman, 132 Ill. App. 3d 886, 889, 478
N.E.2d 534, 536 (1985) (liability for each occurrence under the DSA for commercial
suppliers of liquor is limited to $35,000).
Further, the DSA places an aggregate limitation of $20,000 for the loss of means
of support. Thus, if all five Gustafson children had survived the accident, the family
still would have only recovered a total of $20,000 for the loss of means of support. See
Steller v. Miles, 17 Ill. App. 2d 435, 150 N.E.2d 630 (1958) (held that legislative intent of 1955 amendment to the DSA was to establish an aggregate limitation of
$20,000).
5. Plaintiff need only show that the sale or gift of intoxicating liquor caused the
intoxication and not that the defendant was negligent or that he violated a liquor
control law. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983). The pertinent section of the statute
states "[elvery person who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person,
has a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person
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employees' acts of escorting Gustafson to his car and their failure to
prevent him from driving, while visibly intoxicated, were of no consequence to the widow's cause of action.
Illinois' first DSA was enacted in July of 1872. As revised, the
Act establishes a strict liability standard on dram shop operators for
torts committed either "by" an intoxicated patron or "in consequence of" the intoxication of any person.' Although originally considered penal in nature,7 the DSA was established to create a cause
of action for damages against retail vendors of alcoholic beverages
because none existed at common law." The first Illinois Supreme
Court case to interpret the Act was Cruse v. Aden,9 decided in 1889.
Surprisingly, Cruse is still often cited as precedent for contemporary
dram shop litigation. 0 It was not until 1961 when the Illinois Supreme Court for the first time addressed the issue of whether a common law action existed apart from the DSA against retail vendors of
alcoholic beverages for injuries their intoxicated customers caused."
Although the Act itself was silent regarding a common law remedy,
the court refused to recognize any remedy apart from the Act. 2
Since 1961, neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor the General
who by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of such person." Id.
(emphasis added).
6. 1871-72 Ill. Laws 552-56. There are two types of actions under the Illinois
DSA. The first, "by" or "direct" actions allow all persons who are injured, in person
or in property by someone who is intoxicated, a cause of action individually against
any person who by selling alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of the person causing the injury. For example, an assault or an automobile collision where the direct act
of an intoxicated person causes injury is considered a "by" cause of action. See Mullin,
Overview of the Act/Defenses, DRAM SHOP/STRUCTURAL WORK ACT (IICLE) § 1.5
to 1.7 (1976). "In consequence" actions arise when an intoxicated person causes injuries to the means of the plaintiff's support. For example, a wife of an injured victim
of a drunk driver has an "in consequence" action if the accident is caused by the
driver's intoxication. Id. at § 1.9. See also Moran, Actions Under Illinois Dram Shop
Act: Theories of Liability, U. ILL. L.F. 191 (1958) (discusses various theories advocated by attorneys seeking to escape the confines of the DSA).
7. See Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, U. ILL.
L.F. 175, 181 (1958) (reviews history of DSA from enactment in 1872 until 1958)
[hereinafter cited as History and Appraisal].
8. See Cunningham v. Brown, 22 II. 2d 23, 30, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1961) (lack
of common law precedent motivated the legislature).
9. 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889) (held that no cause of action exists under the
Act against one not engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors).
10. Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 800, 455 N.E.2d 842, 843 (1983) (common
law cause of action sought against social host); Wienke v. Champaign County Grain
Ass'n, 113 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1008, 447 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (1983) (noted that Aden
recognized that no common law tort liability arises from furnishing liquor to a strong
and able bodied man); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 598, 421 N.E.2d 1046,
1047 (1981) (serving of alcoholic liquors to social guests does not create potential liability to third parties).
11. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961) (widow sued
tavern operator who supplied liquor to husband who became despondent and took his
own life).
12. Id.
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Assembly have sufficiently re-examined policy considerations behind
the DSA and its impact on society.' 3 Numerous plaintiffs, however,
have presented meritorious claims requesting that a distinct common law action be recognized apart from the DSA.' 4 In each case
the appellate courts have deferred the question to the legislature or
have asked the supreme court to re-evaluate the law.' 5 Contrary to
the Illinois courts' conclusions, other jurisdictions have expanded
both statutory and common law remedies involving dram shop liability.'6 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit and one Illinois appellate decision have recognized a non-statutory cause of action against dram
shop operators based upon interpretations of the Illinois common
law."
Despite the continuous evolution of the common law in other
areas, the Illinois Supreme Court and General Assembly have apparently decided to leave the DSA in the antiquated form in which it
was originally enacted.' 8 This comment will analyze the origins of
13. The supreme court has only reviewed its decision in Cunningham on two
occasions. See Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112 (1982); Graham v.
United States Grant Post, 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969). In Demchuk, the court
summarily affirmed its prior holding in Cunningham, stating that the statutory dram
shop action is the exclusive remedy in Illinois against tavern operators. Demchuk, 92
I1l.2d at 10, 440 N.E.2d at 116. The Demchuk court, however, refused to review the
merits of the plaintiff's case in any detail. In Graham, the court stated the plaintiff's
contention was without merit because the precise issue of common law negligence for
selling alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person was definitively decided in Cunningham. Graham, 43 Ill. 2d at 8, 248 N.E.2d at 660.
14. See, e.g., Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 (1983)
(dram shop sold liquor to a minor who later injured himself in an auto accident after
the minor's mother specifically warned defendant not to serve liquor to her son);
Gora v. 7-11 Food Stores, 109 Ill. App. 3d 109, 440 N.E.2d 279 (1982) (no cause of
action for seventeen year old minor who suffered injuries from falling asleep in snow
bank after purchasing liquor from a food store).
15. See Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 407, 449 N.E.2d 209, 211
(1983) (court suggested that the instant case is an excellent vehicle for a re-examination of the law in the face of legislative inaction).
Because supreme court precedent in effect ties the hands of the appellate courts,
a common law breakthrough might only be accomplished when some appellate court
takes the radical move of recognizing a common law cause of action. Continued inaction by both the supreme court and legislature will eventually warrant appellate court
action.
16. See infra note 69.
17. Smith v. Pena, 621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980) (army employees found negligent in permitting individuals, who later caused a serious auto accident, to consume
excess amounts of liquor); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 IIl. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292
(1963) (accident occurred outside of Illinois, thus DSA inapplicable). See infra notes
46-57 and accompanying text for extended discussion of both Smith and Colligan.
18. The court in Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982), stated:
A common law doctrine which developed in the horse and buggy days may be
out of tune with today's society. The serious danger to the public caused by
drunken drivers operating automobiles on public roadways is now a matter of
common knowledge that was not experienced by the public when the common
law doctrine of denying third parties' recovery against tavernkeepers was
developed.
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dram shop liability and review the history of the Illinois DSA.. Additionally, the comment will discuss specific judicial interpretations
that have mused over what Illinois dram shop liability would be absent statutory limitations. This comment urges the Illinois Supreme
Court to follow trends adopted in other jurisdictions and advocates
the abandonment of strict liability in dram shop actions. In closing,
the comment explains why equitable solutions to the problems
presented by the DSA will only evolve when the Illinois Supreme
Court re-evaluates liquor vendor liability' s through an analysis of
the elements of common law fault found in meritorious claims.20
Id. at 629, 651 P.2d at 1273.
19. This comment will not discuss, other than in the footnotes, either social
host liability or employer liability for serving alcoholic beverages to guest or employ-

ees who later cause injuries as a result of their intoxication.
In Illinois, numerous plaintiffs have pursued a common law cause of action for
social host liability. See Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842 (1983)
(defendant held a party at his parents' home and collected money from guests, court
held DSA inapplicable); Thompson v. Trickle, 114 11. App. 3d 930, 449 N.E.2d 910
(1983) (employee became intoxicated at a beer and pizza party sponsored by employer and later caused an auto accident); Coulter v. Swearingen, 113 Ill. App. 3d 650,
447 N.E.2d 561 (1983) (defendants permitted minor guests to consume intoxicating
liquor in their home and minor later drove his vehicle into plaintiff).
Illinois has consistently refused to follow trends in other jurisdictions that have
recognized social host liability. See, e.g., Sosa v. Ackerby Communication, No. 8335494 (Dade City Fla. Apr. 12, 1984) ($2.5 million settlement for brain damage when
plaintiff's auto was struck by an employee who allegedly became intoxicated at an
office party); Holmquist v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. App. 1984) (recognized common law negligence action for violation of criminal statute which prohibits furnishing
alcoholic beverages to minors), rev'd, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985)(en banc); Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (held social host who enables adult guest
at his home to become drunk is liable to third parties); Congini v. Portersville Value
Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (minor at Christmas party of employer given
keys to his auto despite employer's awareness of minor's intoxication).
For a general discussion on the subject of liability to third parties for causing the
intoxication of an employee or social host, see Comment, Employer Liability for a
Drunken Employee's Actions Following an Office Party: A Cause of Action Under
Respondeat Superior, 19 CAL. W.L REV. 107 (1982) (lists the jurisdictions that have
DSA's and alcohol control statutes); Comment, Social Host Liability for Injuries
Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D. L. REV. 445 (1983) (contrasts
the theories behind DSA's and common law liability for serving liquor either socially
or commercially); Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors, Employers, and Social Hosts for Torts of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1013 (1983) (briefly
reviews the theories of liability of the intoxicated and focuses on North Carolina's
laws). See also Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1285 (1973) (liability of person furnishing intoxicating liquor for negligent acts of minor causing injury to plaintiff).
20. It is the writer's contention that limitations placed upon damage awards to
innocent victims of the negligent acts of intoxicated patrons of dram shops makes the
current DSA archaic, inadequate, and unjust in light of societal demands and public
policy. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text. Liability insurance covering the
intoxicated driver is often inadequate to fully compensate injured plaintiffs. If death
or serious injuries occur, who pays for the loss of support or medical bills if the motorist is uninsured and the plaintiff's coverage is inadequate to fully compensate for
the loss sustained? Although liability insurance for motorists is mandatory in Illinois
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2 § 12-603.1 (1983), numerous motorists still driver without
coverage.
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ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS DRAM SHOP ACT

The language and substance of the current DSA is closely related to that of the 1874 act.2 1 The 1874 Act was passed in the wake
of a national temperence movement spearheaded by "the mighty
clamor" of the Women's Crusade of the early 1870's.2' After the repeal of prohibition, the 1874 Act was re-enacted with only minor
changes.2 3 Until 1949, virtually all causes of action against dram
shops were brought under the statute because it utilized the theory
of strict liability, and recoverable damages, both actual and exemplary, were unlimited.2 4 A potential common law remedy, as a distinct action apart from the DSA, only became important after a
1949 amendment.2 The amendment placed limitations on recoverable damages26 and expunged the statute's provisions for exemplary
damages.2 7 Just prior to the 1949 amendment, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the liability imposed, and the nature of recoverable
damages under the DSA, were exclusively of statutory origin.2"
In 1961, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Cunningham v. Brown,29
finally addressed the issue whether the common law provided a remedy against a retail vendor of alcoholic beverages for the tortious
actions of intoxicated patrons.3 0 After acknowledging that the plainILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43 (Hurd 1874).
22. History and Appraisal, supra note 7, at 176-77. Ogilvie gives a detailed
description of the historical setting of the times in which the temperance movement
was flourishing across the nation in the 19th Century. In addition, Ogilvie analyzes in
detail the evolution of the statute up until 1958. Id. at 177-81.
23. Id. at 178-79.
24. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 25-6, 174 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1961). See
supra note 13 for a discussion of Cunningham and its progeny.
25. See id. at 26, 174 N.E.2d at 155; History and Appraisal, supra note 7, at
179.
26. Recoverable damages, unlimited in amount prior to the 1949 amendment,
were restricted to a maximum of $15,000. 1949 Ill. Laws 816.
27. Id. Today only three state statutes specifically provide for exemplary as well
21.

as actual damages. ALA. CODE

§

6-5-71 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002

(1983); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978).
28. Howlett v. Doglio, 402 I1. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949). The court in Howlett
noted "Itihe liability imposed and the nature of the damages recoverable is of statutory origin, and is expressly and exclusively defined in the Dram Shop Act." Id. at
318, N.E.2d at 713. When the statute was originally enacted, exemplary and actual
damages were both unlimited in amount. Thus, the supreme court never occasioned
the need to expand the applicable law through the recognition of a common law
action.
29. 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961).
30. Id. at 25-6, 174 N.E.2d at 156. The plaintiff sought a common law remedy,
in addition to the remedy under the DSA, so that she would not be limited to the
damages provided under the Act. Id. at 24, 174 N.E.2d at 155. The theory advanced
by the plaintiff was that when a sale of intoxicants is made to one already drunk or a
minor, and that incapacity is or should be known to the vendor, the sale and consumption are merged and become the act of the seller and the proximate cause of the
injury. Id. at 30, 174 N.E.2d at 157.
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tiff's argument had some merit,3 the court held that the DSA provided an exclusive remedy against tavern operators for injuries to
victims. 3 2 Since 1961, the supreme court has summarily dismissed all

challenges to the DSA based upon a common law theory of
33
recovery.
Recent judicial interpretations concerning the DSA mirror the
Cunningham decision. History indicates, however, that the public's
attitude towards highway safety has changed significantly since the
Cunningham decision.3 4 Since 1961, theories of common law liability
in dram shop litigation and other areas of tort law have been overwhelmingly adopted throughout the nation. 5 Based upon a review
of trends in other jurisdictions, changes in societal perceptions and
the evolution of the common law, it will only be a matter of time
before Illinois will recognize a common law action that co-exists with
the DSA.3 6
Stated Purpose of the Act
When originally enacted, the underlying purpose of the Illinois
DSA was considered penal in nature, and early opinions interpreting
the statute confirmed that policy. 7 This stated purpose was expressed in appellate court decisions even in relatively recent times.3 8
31. Id.
32. Id. at 30-2, 174 N.E.2d at 157.
33. See Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112 (1982) (see supra
note 13 for a discussion of the case); Graham v. United States Grant Post, 43 Ill. 2d 1,
248 N.E.2d 657 (1969) (brief statement that DSA was exclusive remedy; the court did
not discuss the merits of a common law action). Note, however, that an appellate
court, in 1963, recognized a common law cause of action. See infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
35. E.g., Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981) (adoption of comparative negligence); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 I1. 2d 1, 374
N.E.2d 437 (contribution recognized against joint tortfeasors), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
946 (1978).
36. The Illinois common law has witnessed major changes in the past decade.
For example, the concept of comparative negligence was once thought to be too radical and an opening of the floodgates to lawsuits where contributory negligence was
present. See Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968), rev'd, Alvis v. Ribar,
85 Ill.2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). The supreme court in Maki believed that the
adoption of comparative negligence should be mandated by the Illinois General Assembly. Therefore, as a result of legislative inaction, the Alvis court adopted comparative negligence in 1981. Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 43, 421 N.E.2d at 905.
37. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889) (court remarked that the DSA
is a statute of a highly penal character and should receive a strict construction). See
also History and Appraisal, supra note 7, at 181. Ogilvie noted that the purpose of
the DSA was temperance. There was no concern for the potential disasterous type of
multi-car accidents that began to occur in the twentieth century.
38. See Maras v. Bertholdt, 126 Ill. App. 3d 876, 886, 467 N.E.2d 599, 606
(1984) (courts interpret the DSA strictly because the Act is penal in nature); Camille
v. Berry Fertilizers, Inc., 30 111.App. 3d 1050, 334 N.E.2d 205 (1975) (DSA is penal in
character and must be strictly construed); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill.
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Most courts, however, proclaim the remedial nature of the Act as
dominant, noting its purpose is "to impose the costs resulting from
its violation upon those profiting from the sale of liquor to the public." 3 9 Some courts commingle the two acknowledged purposes of the
Act without judicially resolving its dominant purpose. 0
All legislation needs either an express purpose or one that is
reasonably inferable from its language to support the public policy
behind it. Societal concerns have changed dramatically since the
DSA was originally enacted in 1874. Judicial interpretations of the
Act should likewise reflect those changes. Additionally, because the
legislature has failed to adequately articulate the purpose behind
the DSA, the Illinois Supreme Court should undertake that task."
Judicial Recognition of Common Law Liability for the Gift or
Sale of Alcohol
The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the liability imposed and the nature of damages recoverable under the DSA are
expressly and exclusively defined in the Act.'2 Both the Seventh CirApp. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964) (being penal in character, the DSA must be
strictly construed).
39. Fabian v. Polish American Veterans Ass'n, 126 Ill. App. 3d 80, 466 N.E.2d
1239 (1984). See also History and Appraisal, supra note 7, at 182 (the idea of strict

construction of the Act as being penal in nature has been abandoned); Peterson v.
Jack Donelson Sales Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 792, 281 N.E.2d 753 (1972) (DSA embraces
both regulation of liquor traffic and redress for injury, and its purpose is to place
burden of evils of liquor traffic on those who profit therefrom).
Various authors have also commented that the purpose of the DSA is one of a
remedial rather than a penal nature. See, e.g., Moran, Actions Under Illinois Dram
Shop Act: Theories of Liability, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 191; Voelker, Parties to Dram Shop

Actions, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 207 (the purpose of the DSA is to place burden of evils of
liquor on those who profit from it). Moran stated that the Illinois legislature, in its
exercise of the power to regulate the sale of liquor, enacted section 135 to impose on
those who furnish the means of intoxication liability for damages which flow from it.
Moran, supra, at 194.
The court in Smith v. Pena, 621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980), suggested that the
employment of strict liability in the Act showed its remedial purpose, in that elements of proof of wrongdoing were cast aside to make the profiteers of selling intoxicants pay for injuries caused by customers.
40. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Diaz, 31 111. 2d 393, 202 N.E.2d 9 (1964) (Liquor
Control Act is designed to give a remedy and should be allowed to have effect according to its natural and plain meaning); Geocaris v. Bangs, 91 111. App. 2d 81, 234
N.E.2d 17 (1968) (DSA is penal in nature and has as its objective and purpose protection of the public and placing responsibility for injuries caused by intoxication).
41. If truly remedial in nature, the DSA fails to accomplish that purpose. One
definition of a remedial action is that "which is brought to obtain compensation or
indemnity." Cummings v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 190 Okla. 533, 539, 125 P.2d
989, 994 (1942). Since injured parties are infrequently restored to their former position due to the limitations of the DSA, (see Gustafson, 109 Ill. App. 3d 884, 441
N.E.2d 388 (1982)), a compensatory lable on the purpose of the Act is inaccurate.
311, 318, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1949) (not an ac42. Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill.
tionable tort at common law either to sell or give intoxicating liquor to a strong and
able-bodied man).
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cuit, 4" and an Illinois appellate court,"" however, have imposed liability under the common law against a commercial supplier of alcohol for injuries to third parties that were caused by an intoxicated
customer. Each court held that Illinois law would recognize a common law remedy in situations where the DSA was not applicable. 45
The Seventh Circuit, in Smith v. Pena,4 6 found it necessary to
decide what the Illinois common law would be absent the DSA. Notwithstanding the strict liability theory of the DSA, the Smith court
raised the question of whether a commercial supplier of liquor was
negligent in serving drinks to an intoxicated patron. The plaintiffs
in Smith were seriously injured when an intoxicated driver crossed
the center line and struck their vehicle head on. Excessive drinking
allegedly caused the driver's reckless conduct. The intoxicated
driver obtained the liquor from Army employees at a base facility
located in Illinois. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) governed
jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Because the FTCA did not recognize
strict liability in tort claims against the government, the court
needed to determine culpability under a negligence standard based
upon Illinois common law. The court held that when the DSA is
inapplicable, the Illinois Supreme Court would find a dram shop licensee negligent for selling liquor to an intoxicated person who subsequently causes an injury to an innocent victim.4
In an Illinois appellate court decision, Colligan v. Cousar,"s a
thirteen year old Indiana resident was seriously injured when an au43. Smith v. Pena, 621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980) (see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text).
44. Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963). Although the
supreme court rubber stamped its holding in Cunningham after the Colligan decision, (see Graham v. United States Grant Post, 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969)),
the holding in Colligan has never expressly been overruled.
45. In Smith, the defendant was the U.S. Army and jurisdictional coverage was
through the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Smith, 621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980). In
all suits involving federal employees, the exclusive remedy is under the FTCA because the United States government cannot be sued under a common law respondeat
superior theory. See Note, Strict Liability Within the Federal Tort Claims Act: Does
it Belong?, 57 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 499 (1981).
In Colligan, the plaintiff was unable to sue the defendant dram shop under the
DSA because the tort occurred outside the State of Illinois. Colligan, 38 Ill. App. 2d
at 395, 187 N.E.2d at 294. The DSA has no extra-territorial effect. Eldridge v. Don
the Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950) (intoxication occurred
in Illinois and accident arising as a result thereof in another state). See also Waynick
v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959) (cause of action
under Michigan law held that Illinois dram shop was liable for damages for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor because of the general duty owed to plaintiffs under a
common law negligence theory).
46. 621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980).
47. Id. at 875-80. The Smith court relied upon the decision in Colligan. Id. The
court noted that the problem with finding negligence under the DSA that it contravenes traditional notions of proximate cause. Id.
48. 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963).
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tomobile struck him 250 feet outside the Illinois border. Prior to the
accident the driver of the automobile purchased liquor from several
Illinois dram shops located near the Indiana border. The defendant
sold liquor to the driver in violation of a liquor control law which
made it a crime to sell liquor to an intoxicated person. 49 Because the
accident actually occurred in Indiana, the DSA was inapplicable because the DSA has no extra-territorial effect.50 The Colligan court,
however, reasoned that the victim was entitled to a remedy against
the defendant, and therefore it held that the Illinois common law
afforded the plaintiff a cause of action." The court noted that when
a defendant retail vendor sells alcohol to an intoxicated party, he
violates a duty that the DSA imposes on him. Additionally, the
court noted that defendants violate a common law duty to use due
care when they set in operation any agency capable of causing injury
52
to others.
The Colligan decision fails to comport with traditional ideas expressed in earlier Illinois decisions regarding dram shop litigation.
The supreme court, in Cunningham, specifically stated that the
courts have never recognized a common law remedy.5 3 In addition,
the legislature, when it enacted the DSA, intended to create a new
statutory remedy where none previously existed. 5 4 Therefore, the
Colligan decision conceives a non-existent common law cause of action, albeit one based upon sound principles of tort law. Since Colligan and Smith, appellate courts have given mere lip service to the
Cunningham holding and have summarily refused to recognize a
common law remedy apart from the Act.5 These appellate courts
have often recognized the need to review the limitations of the DSA,
49. Id. at 393, 187 N.E.2d at 293. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1955), which prohibited the sale of alcohol to an
already intoxicated person. Id.
50. See supra note 45.
51. Colligan,38 Ill. App. 3d at 414-15, 187 N.E.2d at 300. Note that no common
law existed in Indiana concerning dram shop liability; therefore, even though the tort
occurred in Indiana, Illinois law was used. But cf. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959) (accident occurred in Michigan and the
court used Michigan law, even though the defendant's tortious conduct occurred in
Illinois).
52. Colligan, 38 Ill. App. 2d at 414-15, 187 N.E.2d at 300.
53. 22 Ill. 2d 23, 28, 174 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1961).
54. Id. at 29, 174 N.E.2d at 157.
55. See, e.g., Graham v. United States Grant Post, 43 Il. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657
(1969) (the court devoted two sentences in its opinion to Cunningham, but failed to
acknowledge the Colligan decision); Wienke v. Champaign County Grain Ass'n, 113
Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1009, 447 N.E.2d 1388, 1391 (1983) (any precedent of Colligan was
apparently overruled by Graham).
Based upon subsequent decisions, the Colligan opinion can only be explained
under one of two theories. The Illinois Supreme Court believed that a common law
action exists apart from the DSA, or it quietly acquiesced in the decision because of
the need to compensate the plaintiff.
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but defer that task to the legislature or the supreme court.
The Smith and Colligan decisions indicate that a remedy
against dram shops may exist based upon common law negligence.
These decisions have initiated an assault on the barriers plaintiffs'
face in pleading a common law action.5 s The logic behind the principles set forth in those decisions is persuasive and should be
recognized.5 '
SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY

Social Change and Trends in Sister States
Society can no longer tolerate individuals who drive automobiles while intoxicated. Citizens' organizations have lobbied for stiffer criminal penalties against convicted drunk drivers. Federal and
state governmental agencies have recently initiated proposals seeking new legislation designed to prevent drunken drivers from using
the nation's highways.58 These proposals acknowledge a social
awareness of the problems and the serious financial impact that
drunk driving has on victims of accidents." Specifically, the Illinois
legislature recently considered legislation designed to help prevent
the occurrence of drunk driving accidents.6 0 Similar legislative and
56. Illinois courts have consistently held that the drinking, not the selling, of
alcohol is the proximate cause of intoxication. See Cunningham, 22 Ill. 2d at 30, 174
N.E.2d at 157; Colligan, 38 Ill. App. 2d at 410-11, 187 N.E.2d at 298. See also Annot.,
98 A.L.R. 3d 1235 (1973) (drinking, not selling, held proximate cause of intoxication).

57. The Smith court noted that the main concern in Colligan was finding a
remedy under Illinois law. Smith, 621 F.2d at 879-80. Under the holdings in Smith
and Colligan, if a minor purchases beer in Illinois, drives out of state, and seriously
injures a third party as a result of his intoxication, there exists common law negligence. However, if the same thing happens within Illinois, there is no negligence.
58. The federal government has joined the fight against drunk driving. Under a
recently enacted bill, states are directed to pass statutes that make it illegal for persons under twenty-one to purchase or possess liquor. See 70 A.B.A.J. 35, col. 2 (Nov.
1984).
59. For example, if an innocent third party is seriously injured or killed by an
intoxicated motorist who has inadequate insurance coverage or none at all. Additionally, there are situations where the defendant's conduct approaches willful and wanton standards. E.g., Gustafson v. Mathews, 109 Il. App. 3d 884, 441 N.E.2d 388
(1982) (helping a visibly intoxicated customer to car in which children were located);
Ruth v. Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 (1983) (mother of minor
specifically asked defendant dram shop operator not to sell liquor to her son).
60. See Chicago Tribune, Dec. 13, 1983 at 1, col. 6. This article noted that Illinois has a Task Force on Drunken Driving chaired by Secretary of State, Jim Edgar.
The Task Force recently completed a report for the governor containing forty-nine
recommendations designed to curb the drunken-driving problem. Id. These recommendations included: (1) increasing criminal penalties for persons convicted of reckless homicide involving drunken drivers; (2) require bars to serve foods; (3) require
that bartenders and waitresses receive special training to enable them to more easily
recognize intoxicated customers. Id.
The article also noted that the Illinois Senate approved legislation that required
drivers and their front-seat passengers to wear seat belts. The measure was signed by
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judicial efforts are needed to provide remedies against an institution
that profits from the creation of disasterous situations.
When it was originally enacted, a victim's potential recovery
under the DSA was unlimited. Even when limitations were first
placed upon the amount recoverable, the remedy remained adequate
to justly compensate victims."' Because an accepted purpose of the
DSA is its remedial nature, the Illinois Supreme Court and General
Assembly should recognize that severe limitations on recoverable
damages transgress social concerns.
Other jurisdictions have re-evaluated their common law regarding commercial and social host liability for furnishing liquor to customers and guests.6 2 Concerning commercial liability, remedies have
been recognized under at least four general theories of liability: (1)
common law negligence without reference to any statute;63 (2) comthe governor and became effective July 19, 1985. Illinois became the third state, behind New York and New Jersey, to adopt a mandatory seat-belt law. It is somewhat
ironic that Illinois is in the forefront of preventive legislation, being only one of three
states adopting a mandatory seat-belt law, yet lags behind the field of jurisdictions
providing adequate compensation for injuries under dram shop legislation.
61. See Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: Recent Developments and Alternative Solutions, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 778 (1957). This comment stated, "it seems
fair to conclude that the present act does accomplish its basic purpose of assuring
compensation to the injured party." Id. at 779-80. Since the limits on compensation
have not changed since 1949, this statement is no longer true.
62. The jurisdictions that recognize a common law cause of action against commercial suppliers of liquor reason that personal injury is an eminently foreseeable
consequence of serving an intoxicated customer more liquor. See, e.g., Nazareno v.
Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981) (furnishing liquor may be the proximate cause of
injuries inflicted on a third person by an intoxicated customer); Ono v. Appelgate, 62
Hawaii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (Hawaii 1980) (violation of statute was properly submitted
to jury as evidence of negligence); Hoyt v. Tilton, 81 N.H. 477, 128 A. 688 (1925)
(common law recovery allowed if it appeared that the decedent was in a condition not
to be responsible for his own acts when he accepted the liquor); Tiger v. American
Legion, 125 N.J. Super. 361, 311 A.2d 179 (1973) (jury question if defendant is negligent in serving visibly intoxicated plaintiff liquor, and if it was reasonably foreseeable
that she might not be able to care for herself); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627,
350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (clear trend in United States has been to impose liability
upon a seller in derogation of the common law rule of immunity). The Sorensen opinion noted that twenty-four jurisdictions, other than Wisconsin, had abrogated the
common law rule of nonliability for a liquor vendor. Sorensen, 119 Wis. 2d at 627, 350
N.W.2d at 108. Of those twenty-four states, six also have dram shop acts. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984).
In the area of host liability significant change has taken place. See supra note 19.
In California, the supreme court, in Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577
P.2d 699, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), recognized a common law action against dram
shop operators in conflict with the old rule of nonliability. Shortly after the Coulter
decision, however, the California legislature abrogated the decision by amending CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1714 (1978), which was later upheld in Cory v. Shierlok, 29 Cal. 3d 430,
629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981) (statute aimed at immunizing nonlicensed providers of liquor from civil liability for injuries attributable to intoxication is
constitutional).
63. Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977).
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mon law negligence evidenced by a violation of a criminal statute; 4
(3) negligence proved as a matter of law by violation of Liquor Control Laws;65 and (4) statutory tortious conduct based upon the theory of strict liability." The State of Oregon allows a plaintiff to state
a cause of action based upon three separate theories."' Illinois, however, has consistently rejected recognizing these trends by refusing
to undertake a re-evaluation of the law." Additionally, limitations
on recoverable damages based on the Illinois DSA are inconsistent
with virtually all other dram shop acts.9
Fifteen states currently have dram shop legislation in effect. 0
Of those jurisdictions, only Connecticut and Illinois place dollar limits on recovery.7 1 Connecticut allows recovery up to $20,000 per in72
jured victim with an aggregate limitation of $50,000 per accident;
Illinois allows recovery of $15,000 per injured victim with an aggregate of $20,000 for loss of support. 7 In addition, three states provide
for exemplary damages under their statutes.
64. See ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15 (Burns
1985).
65. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983).
67. See Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or. 689, 696 P.2d 513 (1985).
68. Illinois courts have held that the DSA was intended only to apply to the
commercial aspects of selling, distributing, manufacturing, and wholesaling of alcoholic beverages for profit, and exists to regulate those in the commercial trafficking of
liquor. See Miller v. Moran, 96 11. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981) (recognition
of host liability would be a drastic move for Illinois, yet numerous other states have
recognized the cause of action); Lowe v. Rubin, 98 Ill. App. 3d 496, 424 N.E.2d 710
(1981). The Lowe court stated that the legislature might reasonably have assumed
that the imposition of the sole and exclusive liability upon the consumer of alcoholic
beverages would encourage some heightened sense of responsibility in the drinker for
his acts, thereby ultimately reducing the frequency of alcohol-caused injuries. Id. at
500, 424 N.E.2d at 713. This is a rather absurd statement because if the lack of responsibility for one's own safety, evinced by intoxication, does not deter irresponsible
acts, nothing will. See also Comment, Host Liability for Civil Damage Under Dram
Shop Act, 37 CHI[-]KENTr L. REV. 123 (1960) (discusses host liability and concludes
that § 135 of DSA will allow third parties to sue hosts in the event a guest becomes
inebriated and causes harm); Stanner, Liability of Social Host for Off Premises Negligence of Inebriated Guest, 68 ILL. B. J. 396 (1980) (modern case law in Illinois and
other jurisdictions is broadening the scope of social host liability).
69. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying test.
70. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1974); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 123.92 (West. Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 18.933 (Callaghan 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (1984); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney Supp.
1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-1 (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135
(1983).
72. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1983).
74. See supra note 27.
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A review of trends in other jurisdictions, coupled with consistent Illinois legislative inaction, suggests that the supreme court
should initiate legislative review through the recognition of a common law cause of action.7 Advocates favoring the recognition of a
distinct common law action apart from the DSA are not seeking,
widespread revisions, but only reasonable expansion of the law to
provide adequate compensation to injured victims. The recognition
of a fault theory of liability would
create a more equitable result for
76
plaintiffs as well as defendants.

Unjust Reliance on the Doctrine of Strict Liability
One of the major problems with the current DSA is its reliance
on strict liability.7 7 Of the fifteen states that currently have dram

shop legislation in effect, Illinois is the only state that employs the
doctrine of strict liability in the absence of a liquor control law violation.7 8 Under Illinois strict liability principles, a dram shop will be
held strictly liable for injuries an intoxicated patron causes if the
sale or gift of liquor induces the intoxication.79 Liability regardless
of fault causes conceptual problems because it is contrary to the
traditional notion that liability, and thus compensation, should flow
from the party at fault to the injured victim.
The strict liability standard, however, has been expressed as a
desirable element for plaintiffs because it imposes a higher standard
of conduct on defendants, and thus accomplishes more for plaintiffs
75. This suggestion stems from observations of how other jurisdictions have initiated action by their legislatures. See, e.g., supra note 62. The California Supreme
Court initiated action by the legislature, when it recognized a common law action
against dram shops.
The Illinois Supreme Court similarly used the common law to create a cause of
action after deferring the issue of comparative negligence for legislative action. See
Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). In Alvis, the court noted the number of jurisdictions that recognized the comparative form of negligence for tort liability. The court further noted that inaction by the legislature in this area of the law no
longer was supported by current public policy. Id. Legislative inaction in the area of
the dram shop statute can similarly be interpreted as an invitation to the supreme
court to act in conformity with changing social attitudes.
76. Imposing liability without fault is harsh treatment of defendants who act
responsibly.
77. Although the DSA relies upon strict liability, fault or negligence is not totally abrogated by the statute. See Note, The Fault Concept in Illinois, 1968 U. ILL.
L.F. 379. This law review article points out that fault or negligence of the defendant is
immaterial under the statute. However, fault of the person seeking recovery might
still be fatal to the action (e.g., contributory negligence or assumption of risk of the
victim). Therefore, the civil liability section of the DSA is not a total abrogation of
the fault concept, but rather renders immaterial only the fault of one party-the person against whom recovery is sought. Id. at 398.
78. See supra note 70. All the other dram shop statutes require that the plaintiff show a statutory violation involved with liquor or that the establishment caused
the patron's intoxication.
79. See supra note 5.
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than a simple negligence standard would.80 While the current DSA
eases the burden on plaintiffs to prove that the defendant is liable,
the limitation on recoverable damages makes the statute unjust.
Moreover, strict liability is manifestly unfair to retailers who take
adequate precautions against violating liquor control laws, and otherwise use due care to avoid creating a potentially dangerous
situation."1
The doctrine of strict liability also forms the basis of liability in
Illinois products liability laws. In 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the concept of strict liability in tort for a defective product. 2 Comparisons of the two applications of the strict liability concept are unavoidable. Both applications of the doctrine comport
with cited public policy concerns. Specifically, those concerns are
public safety and the equity of imposing the economic burden of
injury on the party who creates the risk of injury and reaps a
profit.8 " The fact that defendants can increase the price of their
products in order to compensate for increases in liability insurance
supports this risk shifting theory. An additional similarity between
the DSA and the products liability application of strict liability is
that fault is a factor when considering the injured victim's conduct,
but the conduct of the defendant is not considered. For example,
defendants can defeat the cause of action or significantly mitigate
recoverable damages, through comparative negligence claims.84
Plaintiffs who plead a products liability action, however, have a
clear advantage over their counterparts pleading a strict liability
theory in a dram shop action. Because products liability is a creature of the common law, it has had the benefit of evolving with societal change over its twenty year history. In addition, recoverable
damages for a defective product are unlimited, thus allowing for adequate compensation to injured victims. In comparison, the DSA
was enacted in horse and buggy days when vehicular catastrophes
were unknown.85 The Act remains a relic of the nineteenth century
and has not benefitted from consistent judicial re-evaluation as has
products liability law.
80. Smith, 621 F.2d at 878 n.4. (the significance of strict liability upon which
the DSA is based is that non-negligent as well as negligent tavern owners are liable).
81. See Foltz, Alcohol on the Rocks, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 1984, at 52. This magazine article highlights a new sobriety policy at a bar in Amherst, Massachusetts. The
bar did away with its "happy hour," 50-cent beer specials, and half-price drinks. It
placed notices on every table warning patrons not to mix drinking with driving, and
sends home customers who ignore the caution in taxis. Id.
82. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (court
followed decisions from several other jurisdictions).
83. Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
84. See supra note 77.
85. See supra note 18.
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Numerous appellate decisions have deferred the issue of expanding the remedies under the DSA to the Illinois General Assembly.86 The General Assembly, however, has not acted substantively
on the issue of recoverable damages since 1949.87 Therefore, supreme court action is necessary to force the legislature's hand in
amending the DSA.
The genius of the common law is that it constantly expands to
meet new and unique conditions.8 8 The common law is not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own principles adapts itself to varying
conditions.8 9 Even where there is some evidence of the legislative
intent by its failure to act, the supreme court is not foreclosed from
amending the common law. A failure to pass or amend legislation is
so equivocal that it is meaningless.9 0
The supreme court has noted in dicta that justice requires more
than simple honor and respect for prior decision because if these
were our only guides "the path of jurisprudence would never change
irrespective of a changing world." 91 If the supreme court found that
a common law remedy existed apart from the DSA, the legislature
could amend or pre-empt the courts' holding. Legislative acquiescence to societal change, however, should not bind Illinois courts in
adhering to the common law as it existed in 1889."2 Because the
common law rule of non-liability originated in the nineteenth century, the Illinois Supreme Court should recognize that the DSA, in
its present form, is inconsistent with generally accepted contemporary tort law.
86. See Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 2d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842 (1983) (any enlargement of its scope is the prerogative of the legislature, not the judiciary); Thompson v.
Trickle, 114 Ill. App. 3d 930, 449 N.E.2d 910 (1983) (change in the law with such a
great impact is best done by legislature). Cf. supra note 15.
87. See supra notes 24-7 and accompanying text.
88. Colligan, 38 Ill. App. 2d at 414, 187 N.E.2d at 300.
89. Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (vendor sold to
minor who caused injury to third party). The Sorensen court made a number of
statements about our common law heritage that the Illinois Supreme Court should
heed. "[Als a part of our common law heritage, this court is free to amend the common law." Id. at 633, 350 N.E.2d at 112. The legislature may amend or change the
court's determination of the common law, but Illinois courts should not be bound to
adhere to holdings in the common law as it existed in 1949 under the Howlett decision. The Howlett court recognized the DSA as the exclusive remedy for victims
against dram shop operators. 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949).
90. Sorensen, 119 Wis. 2d at 635, 350 N.W.2d at 112.
91. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 82, 117 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1954). In Ney, the
owner of a parked car left his keys in it and a thief took the car and injured another
person. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the owner's act of negligently leaving
his keys in the car was a proximate cause of the injury. Id. Note the defendant's acts
in Ney were in violation of a statute that made it illegal to leave a car unattended
with the engine running. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 /2, § 189 (1957). The court thus
used a criminal statute to impose civil liability under the common law. 92. In 1889, the supreme court in Cruse v. Aden established the common law
rule of non-liability to dram shops. 127 Il. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
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ANALYSIS OF A COMMON LAW ACTION

The supreme court in Cunningham v. Brown recognized the
need for "serious consideration" to re-evaluate the purpose and limitations of the DSA." The court noted that the plaintiff's argument
had some merit, and, if no more was involved than establishing a
new rule of liability it would warrant more serious consideration.
Apparently, the court was reluctant to change the common law rule
of non-liability that existed for over seventy years. Those fears that
prevented the court in 1961 from recognizing a new common law
cause of action, however, have effectively been overcome in other
areas of the law."" For example, barriers to comparative negligence,
products liability in tort, and the recognition of concurrent proximate causes have all been effectively overcome without significant
hardships to defendants or the court system.95
Additionally, Illinois historically has used criminal statutes as a
basis for establishing minimum standards of conduct for imposing
civil liability.9 Illinois, however, refuses to use liquor control laws
("LCL") for this purpose. The most common LCL are the prohibition of sales of liquor to minors,9 to intoxicated persons," and to
93. 22 Ill. 2d 23, 30, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1961).
94. See, e.g., Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981) (see supra note
75); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Il1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (recognized
strict liability in tort for a defective product). Prior to the Alvis and Suvada deci-

sions, Illinois courts were concerned about broadening the common law because of
the expected increase in litigation and liability to potential defendants.
95. See supra note 94.
96. See, e.g., Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954) (see
supra note 91). In order for a criminal statute to be used as a basis of imposing civil
liability on the violator, the courts have to adopt and adapt the statute into the common law.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that a duty of care and the attendant
standard of conduct may be found in a statute silent on the issue of civil liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1 286, Comment d (1965). Section 286 states:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons
which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the particular interest which is being invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the
kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the
particular hazard from which the harm results.
97.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1983).

98. Id. See Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112 (1982) (plaintiff sought common law remedy on basis that defendant dram shop sold liquor to
intoxicated customer; court denied cause of action); Gustafson v. Mathews, 109 Ill.
App. 3d 884, 441 N.E.2d 388 (1982) (see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text). But
cf. Smith v. Pena, 621 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1980); Waynick v. Chicago's Last Depart-

ment Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187
N.E.2d 292 (1963). The Smith, Waynick, and Colligan courts all developed a theory
of recovery under the common law by using the violation of a criminal statute, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1983), as a basis for recognizing foreseeability to find negligence and proximate cause.
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habitual and known drunks."s Other states that have dram shop
statutes,1 0 however, have adopted LCL as a basis for finding negligence and for imposing civil liability against retail liquor vendors. 10 1
A brief analysis of the common law elements of negligence, proximate cause, duty, and breach of duty, shows how Illinois dram shop
liability could change, absent the adherence to the doctrine of strict
liability.
The question of whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty
to act in a specific manner is the first element of common law negligence, and it is specifically a question of law for the court to decide.
Based upon the United States Constitution, there exists a clear public policy which favors the right of dram shops to operate." 2 The
Illinois legislature has expanded upon this public policy by specifically placing limitations on recoverable damages under its DSA.
Such a strong statement of public policy indicates that any courtfashioned imposition of a common law duty should only occur after
careful scrutiny of what constitutes culpable conduct on the part of
a dram shop defendant.
The duty standard should be determined through the recognition of LCL violations as a basis for imposing civil liability. Alternatively, a duty should be recognized when a dram shop operator or
employee has a clear opportunity to defuse a potentially life threatening situation.'0 " Thus, a showing of utter disregard for the safety
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (1983).
100. See supra note 70.
101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1984) (liability based upon sales to already
intoxicated patrons); UTAH CODE ANN. 32A-14-1 (1985) (liability based upon violation
of liquor control laws).
There seems little doubt that the Illinois LCL found in section 131 of the DSA
satisfies the requirements of The Restatement (Second) of Torts for imposing civil
liability based upon a statute. See supra note 96. Plaintiffs seeking a common law
remedy are members of the public (the protected class), whose physical well being, is
sought to be protected against a hazard (the irresponsible acts of intoxicated persons). See Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 675 (Alaska 1981).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1 and 2 (repeals amendment XVIII forbidding
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors).
103. For example, in addition to using the liquor control laws as a basis of imposing civil liability, (see supra notes 96-101), the courts could fashion a standard
based upon conduct approaching willful and wanton proportions. See, e.g., Ruth v.
Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 (1983) (see supra note 14); Gustafson v. Mathews, 109 Ill. App. 3d 884, 441 N.E.2d 388 (1982) (see supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text). In both Ruth and Gustafson, the defendant's alleged negligent
conduct involved more than merely selling liquor to customers in violation of liquor
control laws.
Illinois courts should recognize a duty of tavern owners, and other dram shops,
who reap profits from the sale of liquor, to care for someone who is visibly unable to
care for himself. For example, dram shop operators should ensure that drunk patrons
are with friends who are driving or otherwise call a cab or the police. Prosser has
stated "[t]here may be no duty to take care of a man who is ill or intoxicated, and
unable to look out for himself, but it is another thing to eject him into the danger of a
railroad yard, and if he is injured there will be liability." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
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of an intoxicated patron or others would rise to the level of willful or
wanton conduct upon which liability could be based.
The second element of common law negligence involves the
breach of a judicially recognized duty. Undoubtedly, all dram shop
operators should be able to foresee potential injury resulting from
the actions of their intoxicated patrons. 0 4 The use of a simple foreseeability standard, however, would contribute to the same problems
that the supreme court and the legislature presumably desire to
avoid. These problems include shifting the burden of liability for
compensating victims from the intoxicated customer to the potentially deep pocket: the dram shop or the insurance carrier. A breach
of duty on the part of the defendant should appropriately be established upon a showing of an operator's lack of due care in identifying potential problems. Evidentiary considerations for establishing a
breach of duty should be developed through the adoption of criminal standards set forth in LCL'05 or negligent conduct that approaches willful and wanton proportions. 06
Finally, Illinois courts, in accord with the old common law principles,' O7 have consistently held that the consumption and not the
serving of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of intoxication."0 ' Over the past decade, however, Illinois has significantly modified its common law theories of contributory negligence, assumption
of risk, and comparative negligence. 09 Moreover, a large number of
jurisdictions subsequently began to recognize the sale of alcoholic
beverages as the proximate cause of injuries in cases involving ven56, at 343 (4th ed. 1971). The same reasoning can be applied to
one who escorts a visibly intoxicated man to his auto.
104. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322, 325 (1959)
(every person has a general duty to use due care or ordinary care not to injure others
or to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him).
105. See supra notes 96-101.
106. See Gustafson, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 886, 441 N.E.2d at 389. The court noted
that the tavern employees' responsibility and undertaking ended when they deposited
Gustafson in his car safely. Id. at 888, 441 N.E.2d at 392.
107. See Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969) (selling of intoxicants to intoxicated person is not proximate cause); Griffin v. Sebek, 245 N.W.2d 481
(S.D. 1976) (no common law cause of action); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176
N.W.2d 566 (1970) (it is not a tort to sell intoxicating liquor to able-bodied men).
108. Colligan, 38 Ill. App. 2d 411, 187 N.E.2d at 307.
109. See Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983)
(merged contributory negligence and assumption of risk into a form of comparative
negligence used to offset liability in tort for a defective product). See Dripps, Comparative Fault and Comparative Negligence-Is There a Difference?, 72 ILL. B.J.
16(5) (1983) for an excellent analysis of the Coney decision and its effect on Illinois
common law. See also Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1,
374 N.E.2d 437 (1977) (recognized contribution among joint tortfeasors, thus furthering the recognition of concurrent proximate causes and comparative negligence), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978). See also Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Il1.21, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981)
(see supra note 75).
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dor liability.'1 Accordingly, these changes acknowledge the notion
that proximate cause, because it is a matter of public policy,"' is
subject to the changing attitudes and needs of society. Therefore, it
is difficult to comprehend Illinois' continued adherence to the idea
that serving alcoholic beverages is not a proximate cause of
intoxication.
After pleading a prima facie case, plaintiffs would still have the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they are
entitled to a recovery. Moreover, adequate defenses based upon a
common law negligence standard would likewise be available to defendants who take precautions to avoid violating liquor control statutes." ' For example, commercial vendors could regularly verify
identification of customers, and tavern owners could give special
training to bartenders and waitresses to allow them to spot inebriated customers. Therefore, numerous arguments against expanding
dram shop liability are largely without merit.
The best defense available to a dram shop operator under a
fault concept is a due care argument of operating a reputable establishment." s Elements of proving due care would include evidence of
a clean record concerning LCL violations. Additionally, proper
training of employees, verifying identifications of patrons, and monitoring customer consumption to the extent plausible would all indicate a total lack of willful or wanton conduct."' Moreover, potential
liability would be offset by the comparative negligence of the intoxicated person and any assumption of risk a plaintiff voluntarily
undertakes.
Because one of the goals of imposing dram shop liability is to
help decrease the risks of injury that intoxicated persons create, the
recognition of a fault concept of liability, as opposed to a strict standard, would only further encourage operators to use a high degree of
care when serving liquor. Illinois should thus follow the well-recognized trend in other jurisdictions and acknowledge that personal in110. See, e.g., Vance, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973); Deeds v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 589, 217 N.E.2d
847 (1966) (selling of liquor may be proximate cause of resulting injury); Chartrand v.
Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or. 689, 696 P.2d 513 (1985).
111. Vance, 355 F. Supp. at 761 (states that the modern view, and probably the
majority view, in cases involving a liquor vendor's liability to third persons is that the
furnishing of intoxicants may be the proximate cause of the injuries).
112. See supra note 60. The Task Force on drunken driving has recommended
various proposals to prevent the problem from increasing. If dram shops voluntarily
adopt the recommendations, they could use such as a defense to culpable conduct
when faced with a lawsuit for violation of liquor control laws.
113. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
114. Additionally, bar owners could serve food and coffee at relatively cheap
prices near closing to help sober patrons who would shortly be driving an automobile
after a night of drinking liquor.
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jury is an eminently foreseeable consequence of serving a customer
too much liquor. Moreover, furnishing liquor may be recognized as
the proximate cause of injuries that an intoxicated customer inflicts
on a third person.
CONCLUSION

The limitations which the DSA imposes upon both plaintiffs
and defendants are outdated. These limitations do not comport with
fundamental principles of modern tort law which look to culpable
wrongdoers for compensation of injuries to innocent victims. Revised interpretations of proximate cause and legal duties of commercial vendors initiated in a large number of other jurisdictions are
acceptable platforms from which to launch judicial change. Additional support for recognizing a common law cause of action can be
found in existing penal statutes and situations where a defendant's
conduct approaches willful and wanton proportions.
The task of modifying the DSA should properly be put to the
legislature. However, the exigency of the situation will only be
spearheaded if the Illinois Supreme Court recognizes a common law
action. "1 5 By granting injured third parties a common law cause of
action against dram shops, legislative action is not impinged nor are
stare decisis principles ignored. 1 6 In addition, parties injured by the
negligent acts of both bar patrons and dram shop operators would
be given an opportunity to have a trier-of-fact decide the merits of
their claim. The end result will force tavern owners to bear more
responsibility for their actions in the high incidence of deaths and
injuries caused by intoxicated individuals.
Peter J. Wifier

115. Shortly before publication, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed its holding
in Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961), that the common law
provided no remedy against a retail vendor for the tortious actions of its patrons.
Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 108 Ill. 2d 435, 484 N.E.2d 1088 (1985). The Wimmer
court's reasoning goes no further than to reiterate that no common law duty is owed
to refrain from serving alcoholic beverages under any circumstances. In recent years
Illinois appellate courts have urged the supreme court to perform a re-examination of
the potential application of common law dram shop liability. See supra note 15 & 86.
The Wimmer court not only failed in performing a re-examination, but also failed to
articulate any reason for clinging to outdated precedent.
116. Stare decisis is an important factor in the judicial process, but we must
not forget it is not the whole process. Colligan, 38 I1. App. 2d at 400, 187 N.E.2d at
298.

